From Edmund Conway:
Compelling as it is to believe that the eurozone could have achieved the kind of deep integration that would have come with fiscal union, I am skeptical. Even before the crisis, Europeans had rejected ever-closer union by voting no to the European Constitution (before it was rebranded and shoved through parliaments as covertly as possible).
Some suspected its citizens might be so scared by the crisis that they would finally succumb to such plans. But as economically logical as it is to espouse further fiscal and political integration, the fact is that national borders still matter within Europe. The United States was bound together by a common language, a largely common heritage and similar customs, and yet it still took decades of struggle, a full-blown civil war and years of political reform to achieve a proper monetary union there. Perhaps the euro could have worked given a century (or at a stretch, half a century) of crisis-free smooth running. But the reality is that the international monetary system is beset by crises on a regular basis.
Redistribution within nations is a tricky enough topic to debate, without having to try to extend the same argument internationally. As economically logical as it might have been, the euro project was simply overambitious and unrealistic.
Sovereignty dies hard – harder than the euro project, it turns out.